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Recently a jaded bank official in Bangladesh told me it was time to give up on cajoling 
banks to lend to poor people, especially in rural areas. He was discouraged by chronic loan 
recovery problems--the specialized agricultural bank in the country at the time was collecting less 
than 20 percent of its loans--and by periodic government announcements ofloan forgiveness. 
Since several large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the country had been relatively 
successful in providing loans to poor people, he argued that all rural lending should be transferred 
to them. 1 De facto, this transfer has been underway in dozens of countries where traditional 
development banks and cooperatives have collapsed and where thousands ofNGOs are now used 
increasingly by donors as channels for loans to poor people. Although not announced as such, 
this is resulting in a shift in donor support from production credit to altruistic lending. 
Given this sharp change it may be useful to briefly review why previous approaches often 
failed to provide sustained financial services to poor people and then go on to speculate on the 
strengths and limitations of using NGOs instead. 
Production Credit 
For more than four decades donors employed credit programs in low-income countries to 
stimulate production, investment, and use of modem inputs, with many of these efforts focusing 
initially on farmers . Cooperatives, supervised credit programs, private rural banks, and 
specialized development banks were large parts of this. Government sponsored loan guarantees, 
concessionary funds from central banks, and bank lending quotas were also elements of many 
programs. Donors commonly supported these efforts by placing funds in central banks that were 
on-lent through concessionary credit lines. Although production considerations were the primary 
objective of these efforts, altruism was often a secondary objective; numerous credit programs 
targeted small farmers, for example (Donald 1976; Sacay and others 1986). Unfortunately, many 
of the cooperatives that once provided loans to farmers have disappeared, most of the supervised 
credit programs for farmers have evaporated, numerous rural private banks have collapsed, many 
specialized agricultural development banks have imploded, and most efforts to force commercial 
1ln the early 1990s there were more than 800 registered NGOs in Bangladesh with about 140 
of them pursuing development objectives. Many of the development NGOs offered financial 
services. Even small countries such as Bolivia and Gambia typically have a hundred or more 
developmental NGOs. 
banks to lend in rural areas yielded transitory results. A number of factors combined to 
undermine these production-credit efforts, the following being the most important: 
( 1) Hostile macroeconomic environments often dampened loan demand, lessened the 
creditworthiness of potential borrowers, weakened the ability of borrowers to repay loans, and 
lessened the capacity of many people to save. The weight of this bore most heavily on poor 
people. 
(2) Repressive macro-financial policies also constrained the expansion of formal financial 
markets. Interest rate controls, hefty bank reserve requirements, and extensive loan targeting 
lowered the revenues of formal financial intermediaries and boosted their costs. This discouraged 
them from seeking new clients and from handling small transactions. 
(3) Numerous countries operated centrally planned economies that severely crimped the 
opportunities for small private enterprises which are typically operated by people of modest 
means, thus limiting their creditworthy demand for formal loans. Central planning was 
accompanied by an inflexible banking system that performed mostly fiscal functions, rather than 
financial intermediation, thereby constraining the supply of loans for poor people. 2 
( 4) In many cases loans were part of a package of inputs and there was little attention 
given to the effect credit projects had on the performance of financial intermediaries. Even less 
attention was given to how credit projects affected the ability and willingness of financial systems 
to offer deposit services to large numbers of people. These projects were typically evaluated on 
the basis of changes in the income of borrowers, in production, in use of inputs, in the pace of 
technological change, in employment, or in investments. 3 In many cases donors and governments 
used financial markets as a commons and there was little explicit concern given to enhancing their 
durability. 
( 5) Donors and governments inadvertently warped formal financial markets by providing 
concessionary lines of credit (Vogel 1984). It was often cheaper for banks and cooperatives to 
obtain funds from a central lending source than it was to mobilize private deposits. This resulted 
in relatively few poor people having attractive places to deposit their savings; in numerous cases 
donor-nurtured development banks and cooperatives ignored potential depositors, most of whom 
were relatively poor. 
( 6) Many governments used financial markets to allocate grants by imposing negative real 
rates of interest on both loans and deposits, by occasionally forgiving loans, and by tolerating 
2Centrally planned economies such as the former Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of 
China, however, generally provided savers of small amounts attractive deposit opportunities until 
inflation increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
3F or a recent statement of this see World Bank 1993. 
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hefty loan defaults. This attracted rent seekers who colonized credit programs to the exclusion of 
poor people... These rents attracted bank employees, the military, the politically influential, and 
government officials. 5 
(7) Because governments and donors provided most of the funds for lending, political 
influence permeated the operations of many of these lenders. Bank managers were often political 
appointees rather than bankers, the organizations were usually overstaffed, and political 
considerations commonly overroad prudent lending decisions. This resulted in excessive lending 
costs and in flawed screening of loan applicants for creditworthiness. 
The net results of many of these efforts were institutions that could not endure without 
continual subsidies and financial systems that were allergic to poor people. When donors and 
governments grew weary of continual calls for more subsidies and withdrew their support, many 
donor-addicted organizations imploded. 6 Using Von Pischke's metaphor, the formal financial 
frontier expanded too little, despite massive efforts by donors to extend these frontiers. Many of 
the credit initiatives were unsustainable and became transient salients in these frontiers. This led 
major donors such as the World Bank, the Agency for International Development, and the Inter-
American Development Bank in the late 1980s to reduce substantially their funding for production 
credit projects and to increasingly court NGOs. 7 These activities now include much more 
emphasis on expanding financial services for women and for operators of microenterprises 
~Financial markets have a high propensity to distribute subsidies and grants regressively. 
Interest rate subsidies and the grants realized by absconding with loans are both proportional to 
loan size: large loan, large subsidy; small loan, small subsidy; and no loan, no subsidy. Tilting 
these subsidies in favor of the poor further discourages financial intermediaries from lending to 
poor people by adding to the high costs per-unit-of-money-lent associated with making small 
loans. Ubiquitous low interest rates on loans resulted in even lower interest rates being paid on 
deposits and this penalized poor people because they had relatively few alternatives for holding 
their savings. 
5 A blatant example of this occurred in inflation-racked Sudan several years ago when 
employees of the agricultural bank received most of the zero-interest-rate loans make by the bank, 
ostensibly for charity purposes. 
6Illustrative examples are the Agricultural Development Bank in Bolivia, the Jamaican 
Development Bank, many of the CNCAs in West Africa, the Cooperative Bank of Uganda, the 
FIRA system in Mexico, the directed credit programs of credit unions in Latin America, hundreds 
of rural private banks in the Philippines, the BIMAS program in Indonesia, credit activities in the 
Comilla project in Bangladesh, and lending through many agricultural cooperatives in India. 
7 An Operation Directive (No. 8.30) issued in the early 1990s sharply reduced the World 
Bank's traditional agricultural credit activities. It mandated that credit projects must stress 
improving the performance of financial markets. 
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through semi-formal lenders. It is still an open question, however, whether or not these more 
explicitly altruistic credit programs will be any more effective in reaching poor people than were 
earlier production-credit efforts. 
Recent Changes 
In an increasing number of countries economic environments are now much more 
hospitably for financial markets than was the case earlier, largely due to recognition of the failure 
of previously used strategies, reinforced by donor and International Monetary Fund proddings. 
Exchange rates are less distorted, interest rates are closer to market rates, product and input 
prices are more liberated, central planning has been lessened, and private enterprise is allowed to 
play a larger role in most economies. This has resulted in less inflation, real rates of interest that 
are generally positive, more economic opportunities for small businesses, and less indirect taxing 
of agriculture and of other enterprises commonly populated by poor people. 
Although history cannot be replayed, it would be interesting to see how the credit projects 
of the 1970s and 1980s would have fared in the more hospitable economic environments of the 
1990s in countries such as Argentina, Chile, China, Egypt, Ghana, Mexico, Indonesia, and 
Uganda. One might argue that there would have been fewer credit projects; some of the problems 
that previous credit projects attempted to treat may have been less severe and merited less 
attention. Would loan recovery have been higher? Most certainly. Would a larger number of 
people and firms--particularly small firms--have qualified as creditworthy? Most likely. Would a 
much larger number of people have had the capacity and incentive to place more of their savings 
in financial institutions? With little doubt. Would rent seekers have had incentives to colonize 
subsidized credit programs that had no rents? Of course not. Would many of the financial 
institutions involved have been so seriously undermined? Probably not. Would most of the 
financial institutions involved in development efforts have become addicted to government or 
donor funding? Highly unlikely. Would the formal financial frontier in many low-income 
countries have enveloped a much larger number of poor people? Without a doubt. 
Although I feel loans are weak instruments for prodding development, I am convinced that 
durable financial systems are critical infrastructure in market-driven economies. How else can 
resource be efficiently reallocated among surplus and deficit units? I am particularly pleased with 
the new policies of the World Bank that focus on strengthening financial markets, instead of 
pushing targeted and subsidized credit. Because of major changes in macroeconomic and 
macro finance environments the results of finance programs in the future will likely be more 
satisfactory than was the case in the past. Because of this I am uneasy with the current donor fad 
that involves abandoning production credit and focusing instead on altruistic lending through 
NGOs. 
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The Altruistic Approach 
Most societies have norms that warn against incurring debt. It is jarring, therefore, to hear 
spokespersons for disadvantaged people arguing that credit (debt) is an entitlement for poor 
individuals. The metamorphose of the negative word "debt" into the positive term "credit" 
puzzles me, much as does the conversion of an ugly caterpillar into a lovely butterfly. Evil 
moneylenders are thought to impose debt on their supposed victims by extending loans, but when 
laced with altruism and done with tender loving care by NGOs this act is transformed into 
granting credit to beneficiaries. Strangely, the morality of the act is defined by the intentions of 
the lender. If lenders are concerned about recovering the funds they lend and making a living 
from doing so, it is termed evil. If the lender is using someone else's money, doesn't worry much 
about recovering loans, and must continually seek outside subsidies, it.is termed good. The fact 
that moneylenders usually provide sustained financial services to their clients, while altruistic 
credit activities are often transitory--depending on the depths of the patron's pockets--seldom 
enters the discussion. Also ignored is the fact that managers of most NGOs sustain a much higher 
standard of living than does the average, much maligned moneylender. Capturing some of the 
subsidy that passed through an NGO via attractive salaries, superior transportation, plush offices, 
and foreign travel is seen as part of doing good. 
The term NGO covers a variety of organizations whose objectives range from social to 
developmental (Bowden 1990). Here, I focus only on the increasing number ofNGOs that are 
involved in extending loans or mobilizing deposits, often at the behest of donors. Many of the 
NGOs that currently provide semi-formal financial services were established with altruistic 
objectives. In some cases, financial services were later added to on-going altruistic NGOs, while 
in other cases NGOs were set up initially to be retail outlets for donor or government funds. 
Some of the best NGOs are indigenous while many of the weakest were spawned by donor or 
government funding. Most credit activities in these organizations rest on similar assumptions: 
that credit is a powerful antidote for poverty, that most poor people have a credit need, and that 
NGO managers are the only ones who care enough to lend to poor people. 
Let me pause for a disclaimer: I admire the work and dedication of a few NGOs that 
provide financial services and I hope that a few additional NGOs will evolve into similarly 
admirable organizations. Nevertheless, a much larger number ofNGOs, in my opinion, have little 
chance to grown into efficient organizations. Many pseudo-NGOs are managed by displaced 
government officials, are connected to life-support systems irrigated by government or donor 
funds, have only a few hundred beneficiaries, and are high-cost operations in terms of services 
rendered. In trying to winnow the wheat from the chaff in NGOs, it may be useful to briefly 
summarize their main strengths and limitations in providing financial services. 
Strengths 
The main strength ofNGOs is they are generally grassroots organizations that are working 
with poor people. The fact that these organizations are private operations, that they harness the 
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energy of local people, and that some of them are indigenous further enhances their attractiveness. 
Clearly, a few of these NGOs have been able to fill important niches in existing financial markets: 
credit unions are effectively mobilizing deposits in many countries, the Grameen Bank providing 
loans to poor women in Bangladesh, ACCION International helping operators of small businesses 
access loans in Latin America, and ACORD providing financial services under adverse conditions 
in several African countries (Abugre 1994). The fact that many developmental NGOs are driven 
by altruistic motives further enhances their attractiveness in the eyes of donors with similar 
benevolent objectives. 
Limitations 
When it comes to providing financial services, NGOs have several inherent limitations. 
Because of their hands-on approach to development many of them are high-cost lenders. 
Numerous NGOs lend to less than a thousand beneficiaries and it will be difficult for most of them 
to realize scale economies because of their small size. 
Even more importantly, because they operate mostly outside the formal financial system, 
prudential regulation and supervision are almost totally absent in NGOs. This is not a significant 
problem until NGOs begin to mobilize deposits--unfortunately, few people care if donor funds are 
carelessly lent. Allowing such deposit mobilization without effective prudential regulation, in my 
opinion, is unconscionable. Poor depositors are unable to assemble the information needed to 
assess the financial operations of NGOs and thus individually protect their deposits from 
malfeasance. Donors should be more interested in protecting the interests of depositors through 
prudential regulation and deposit guarantees than they are about filling the supposed credits needs 
of a much smaller number of people. 8 Without proper supervision and regulation NGOs will be 
unable to realize economies-of-scope where the same facilities can be used to produce two 
financial services--loans and deposits--more efficiently than if it only produced one service. This 
deposit-mobilizing handicap will also cripple the ability ofNGOs to expand lending and largely 
restrict them to the largess of donors and government, thus further crimping their ability to realize 
economies-of-scale. 
This handicap will further cripple the ability ofNGOs to screen loan applicants for 
creditworthiness based on their saving record and also constrict the outreach ofNGO's financial 
services. The altruistic culture of many NGOs, and the fact that they are largely using donor 
funds compounds the problems of screening applicants for creditworthiness. If the distinction 
between a loan and a grant is fuzzy in the minds of the altruistic lender, "loans" will likely be more 
clearly seen by beneficiaries as grants. Beneficiaries may be willing to repay loans from an NGO 
as long as the volume oflending is expanding and expectations are that additional loans will be 
available. Loan recovery problems tend to become more severe when the volume ofloans 
stagnates, possibly due to donor fatigue. 
8The highly successful Units program in the Bank Rakyat in Indonesia has about six depositors 
for each borrower 
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Chaves has also stressed the limitations ofNGOs regarding internal incentives. These 
organizations, particularly those that use the cooperative form, have ill defined ownership. 
Altruistic institutions may also have vague standards of performance that are incompatible with 
procedures that screen loans on the basis of creditworthiness. Organizations that are not 
disciplined by market forces and profits may act in ways that are in the best interest of the 
employees and managers of the NGO, rather than in the best interests of the donor or the so-
called beneficiaries. 
Because of their size, most NGOs have a difficult time diversifying their loan portfolio to 
manage risk. Many of them are also highly dependent on surges of external funding that 
compounds management difficulties. Loan recovery problems and relatively high costs, combined 
with altruism, make it difficult for NGOs to cover their costs of operation from loan revenues. 
This will subject them .to the whims and fads of donors and force them to continually seek 
subsidies. Many NGOs also lack standard connections to other financial intermediaries and are, 
therefore, unable to systematically borrow or lend funds through broader financial networks. This 
will limit their ability to mature into more comprehensive financial markets that can intermediate 
over large geographic areas. 
I am particularly concerned about the ultra-altruistic NGOs that one finds operating in 
countries such as Bangladesh, Bolivia, Gambia, and Uganda. These organizations are typically 
small, depend entirely on the beneficence of donors, and compete aggressively for new clients by 
offering soft loans at low or no interest. Their activities undermine the efforts of more serious 
NGOs. Their corporate cultures make it virtually impossible to avoid dispensing grants (Boulding 
1981). 
Conclusions 
Providing formal or semi-formal financial services to poor people, especially in rural areas, 
is expensive. It is not surprising, therefore, that expanding the formal financial frontier to 
encompass these individuals has been difficult. Nor is it surprising that many fledgling financial 
institutions have broken their backs while temporarily providing these services. NGOs face the 
same harsh economic realities. 
Although I'm disappointed with the past performance of production-credit projects, and 
am fully supportive of extending more financial services to poor people, I fear altruistic lending 
through NGOs is not an effective response. Most poor people want better opportunities to save 
and ways to enhance their creditworthiness; a much smaller number of poor people are 
creditworthy. Babbling on about filling credit needs obscures these important facts. Because of 
their non-regulated nature, NGOs are usually ill equipped to provide secure deposit services. It is 
one thing to allow NGOs to do good with other peoples' money through slipshod lending, but it is 
something quite different to promote unsafe deposit mobilization by such organizations. Instead 
of stressing altruistic lending through NGOs, or going back to production credit, donors should 
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emphasize rebuilding and expanding formal financial infrastructure; the economic environment for 
doing so is much improved in many countries. 
Instead of using NGOs, a much larger number of poor people might be reached relatively 
quickly through reformed formal financial institutions--especially on the deposit side. In Egypt, 
for example, a large agricultural development bank has about 1,000 offices located in most rural 
towns and villages. In a relatively short period of time, and with only modest changes in its 
corporate culture, the bank could provide deposit services to millions of additional poor people, 
particularly women. With a slightly revised mission statement and modified employee incentives it 
could find hundreds of thousands of creditworthy borrowers of small amounts who are 
increasingly involved in non-farm businesses in rural areas. Buttressed by appropriate donor and 
government support, these activities could be both profitable and durable. 9 
When it comes to developing durable formal financial systems that are more friendly to 
poor people, donors must alter their traditional money-driven approach. They must focus far less 
on moving large amounts of money which often gets in the way of deposit mobilization and 
concentrate more on reforming financial institutions into more efficient organizations. Major 
donors must play an important role in these reforms. Many of the financial institutions that might 
extend more financial services to poor people are hostages of special interest groups or continue 
to operate under mission statements that are out-of-step with new economic conditions. Many of 
the traditional agricultural development banks, for example, behave like a division of a ministry of 
agriculture, rather than as a bank. They are often managed by agricultural technicians rather than 
bankers, have weak ties to the rest of the banking community, and have directors who know little 
about banking. In other cases, extremely high reserve requirements and other banking regulations 
provide strong disincentives for banks to mobilize deposits, especially from poor people. Donors 
can be instrumental in encourage appropriate changes in these areas. 
In assisting with these reforms, donors face a dilemma. Credit projects that pursue either 
production or altruistic objective directly--something that is politically popular to do--will yield 
disappointing results for basically the same reasons: both approaches cause financial markets to 
function less efficiently and to reach few poor people. Financial-market development projects that 
pursue neither objective directly--something that is politically unpopular--will likely go much 
further in achieving both production and altruistic objectives. 
9The Bank Rakyat's experience in Indonesia with reforming traditional production/altruistic 
lending reinforces this conclusion (Patten and Rosengard 1991 ). Earlier experience in Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan showed that relatively poor people desire deposit services, that many of them 
can become creditworthy, and that serving these client can be profitable for financial institutions 
(Kato 1985; Saeki 1947). 
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